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THE ABOLITION OF SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION:
THE POOR PAY EVEN MORE
JAMES J. WHITE*
In the past two years more than a dozen courts' have considered
the constitutionality of section 9-5032 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. That provision authorizes a secured creditor to seize the col-
lateral from the debtor upon default without judicial process, pro-
vided the creditor can do so without breach of the peace. In one of
those cases, Adams v. Egley,a' the trial court found that the section
was unconstitutional as a denial of due process to the debtor. The
most prominent case holding to the contrary is Oler v. Bank of
America,4 a case decided in the Northern District of California, in
which the court found no state action in the self-help repossession,
thus denied jurisdiction, and in effect upheld the constitutionality
of the section.
A recent Supreme Court case, Fuentes v. Shevin,5 gives added
importance to these cases, for it indicates that at least four mem-
bers of the current Supreme Court regard the analogous process of
replevin (at least as commonly practiced in the typical consumer
context) to be a violation of the due process clause. Undoubtedly
Adams v. Egley or one of the other cases cited in footnote 1 will
come before the Supreme Court within the next year or two.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A., 1956, Amherst Col-
lege; J.D., 1962, University of Michigan.
1. See, e.g., Greene v. First Nat'l Exchange Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672
(W.D. Va. 1972); Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal.
1972); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed
sub nom., Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, No. 72-1484, 9th Cir.
Mar. 15, 1972; McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla.
1971); Kipp v. Cozens, Cty. No. P22038 (Cal. Super. Santa Clara Cty., June
26, 1972); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., Civil No. C929-71 (N.J. Super.
Ct., Union Cty., Sept. 29, 1972); Kosches v. Nichols, 10 UCC REP. SERV. 147
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971).
2. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503 reads as follows:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right
to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured
party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done with-
out breach of the peace or may proceed by action. If the security
agreement so provides the secured party may require the debtor to
assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party
at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reason-
ably convenient to both parties. Without removal a secured party
may render equipment unusuable, and may dispose of collateral on
the debtor's premises under Section 9-504.
3. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed sub nom, Adams v.
Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, No. 72-1484, 9th Cir., Mar. 15, 1972.
4. 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
5. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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In this paper I propose to identify possible ways in which a court
could uphold the constitutionality of section 9-503 without an ex-
plicit rejection of Fuentes v. Shevin. It is my thesis that Fuentes v.
Shevin is probably an undesirable outcome, and that the application
of the same doctrine to self-help repossession is certainly undesira-
ble and would constitute due process gone berserk. My arguments
will not be novel; each has been suggested by the courts that have
considered this matter, or by the briefs of the lawyers who have
argued these cases. I cannot even claim to have collected the data
upon which I rely in the last part of the paper; that task was ac-
complished by Professor Robert Johnson, who has presented it as
an appendix" to an amicus brief in Adams v. Egley.
There are at least three ways in which a court could leave section
9-503 and self-help repossession essentially intact without explic-
itly rejecting Fuentes v. Shevin. First, a court could do what
the district court did in Oler v. Bank of America: Find that there
is no state action and thus no violation of the due process clause.
Second, a court could leave section 9-503 essentially intact by find-
ing that any requirement for a judicial repossession can be waived
by a conspicuous clause in the security agreement. Third, a court
could arrive at that result by a more thorough and careful balanc-
ing of the due process interests than the Supreme Court undertook
in Fuentes v. Shevin. I devote brief comment to the first two
methods of avoiding Fuentes v. Shevin; the bulk of the paper
deals with the third question, how the due process factors should
be balanced.
1. STATE ACTION
Tracing the postwar development of the state action doctrine is
like following a forest trail that meanders in an unpredictable way
to an unseen stopping point. Although the Court is careful to make
each decision apparently consistent with the last, one finds him-
self unable to predict the next case until it has been decided, and
one might argue that the outcomes are dictated largely by unarticu-
lated reasons. Indeed historians may look back upon the Warren
Court's expansion of the state action doctrine as a response to sub-
terfuges that had been erected by whites to avoid racial integra-
tion.7
6. R. Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession: An Economic Analy-
sis, in Brief for Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code as Amicus Curiae, Appendix, Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'1
Bank, No. 72-1484 (9th Cir., filed Mar. 15, 1972).
7. The court in Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal.
1972), explicitly suggests that possibility:
Reitman, which dealt with racial discrimination in violation of the
due process clause, clearly presented a compelling factual situation to
which the Civil Rights Acts and their jurisdictional counterparts
were designed to apply. The historical, legal and moral considera-
tions fundamental to extending federal jurisdiction to meet racial
injustices are simply not present in the instant case.
[VOL. 1973:503
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The modern doctrine consists of a string of judicial decisions run-
ning roughly from Shelly v. Kraemer8 to Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis.9 Perhaps the most arrogant of all the cases is Reitman v.
Mulkey'0 In that case the Court found that the people of Califor-
nia did not have the power to revoke an open housing act, at least
if they also inhibited their legislature from reenacting such an act.
There is no majority opinion in that case and one can find few aca-
demic advocates for the reasoning set forth in the Reitman opin-
ions.11
The trial court in Adams v. Egley placed considerable reliance
on Reitman v. Mulkey. The Adams court found that California's
enactment of section 9-503 of the UCC was an involvement of the
state in the repossession process sufficient to render the act of self-
help repossession subject to constitutional control. Assuming ar-
guendo that Reitman v. Mulkey is good law, one can nevertheless
distinguish Adams v. Egley. First the legislature's enactment of
section 9-503 did not foreclose a subsequent repeal of that same
section. At least on its face Mulkey rests on the proposition that
repeal of an existing statute by means of an amendment to a state
constitution constitutes more than permissible state neutrality on
an issue; it is impermissible state action that involves the state in
the activity it seeks to forbid. One legislature has effectively re-
pealed section 9-503 in consumer cases.12 Nor did the enactment of
section 9-503 encourage an act (repossession) which was not and
could not already have been done under the law of almost all
of our states. 13  One who looks at the history can trace for
8. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
9. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
10. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
11. There are evidently few commentators even willing to attempt to un-
tangle the Reitman opinions. For two who did try, see Black, The Su-
preme Court, 1966 Term Forward: "State Action," Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69 (1967); Horowitz & Karst,
Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967
SuP. CT. REV. 39. Note that Black, in his article, would use a broad defi-
nition of state action, but would limit the use to problems involving racial
disputes.
A cynic might argue that the case stands for the proposition that the
constitutional law operates like a ratchet. That is, one need not have an
open housing law, but once he has enacted it he cannot take it back. The
opinions in that case attempted to escape such a proposition by stating
that the recall did more than simply withdraw the act; it also prohibited
the legislature from further action.
12. See the recently enacted Wisconsin Consumer Act, WIs. STAT. §§ 421-
27 (1971).
13. Examples of cases upholding a seller's common law right to repos-
sess on default include: Sallwan v. Miller, 224 Ala. 395, 140 So. 606 (1932);
Fulton v. Fraser, 76 Colo. 125, 230 P. 600 (1924); Lee v. National Furniture
Stores, Inc., 163 S.C. 204, 161 S.E. 450 (1931) (all involving repossession
pursuant to chattel mortgages). Other examples include: Silverstein v.
Kohler & Chase, 181 Cal. 51, 183 P. 451 (1919); Zeff v. Harvey Smith Olds-
mobile Co., 154 Cal. App. 2d 1, 315 P.2d 371 (1957); Salinger v. General Exc.
NuBR2)
HeinOnline  -- 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 505 1973
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
several centuries the right of the creditor to self-help reposses-
sion.1 4  Indeed it appears that in most of our states a secured
creditor could engage in self-help repossession even though there
was no clause explicity giving him that right in the security agree-
ment and even though there was no statute that authorized his
repossession.'" So well-entrenched was the idea of self-help repos'
session that a person who argued in 1954 that the enactment of
section 9-503 was unconstitutional would have been met with
amazement on the part of the draftsmen.
If the courts choose to find impermissible state action in the en-
actment of section 9-503, where is the stopping place? Does such a
decision mean that a probate statute, which gives the decedent the
capacity to discriminate in favor of his church, his race, or his sex,
is unconstitutional? Does it mean that the common law, which au-
thorizes a lessor to seize property from a lessee, is also unconstitu-
tional? And how does one distinguish the whole of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code and the rest of property law? These
laws permit the transfer of property rights without the intrusion
of the courts, without due process. Perhaps they too are unconsti-
tutional; perhaps no deed should be effective and no security agree-
ment recognized until it has received judicial sanction and each
party has been given an opportunity to show that he was acting of
his own free will, not under mistake or undue influence. Of course
such suggestions are preposterous and presumably the deed and se-
curity agreement cases can be distinguished on the ground that
the transferor gives his contemporaneous agreement and that
this is an effective waiver of any due process right or obviates
the need for it. But what if empirical research were to show that
the typical debtor in fact understands and expects that the creditor
will repossess when the debtor defaults, and that in all but an in-
significant minority of the repossession cases the debtor is in fact
seriously in default at the time of repossession? Should we not
recognize this expectation as tantamount to a contemporaneous
agreement to transfer?
In any event I conclude that a finding of state action here would
be a further unwise step beyond the unwise conclusion of Reitman
v. Mulkey. Yet one who attempts to fit the repossession case into a
Ins. Corp., 217 Iowa 560, 250 N.W. 13 (1939); Mendelson v. Irving, 139 N.Y.
1065, 155 App. Div. 114 (1913); Shelby v. Hudelburg Chevrolet, Inc., 361
P.2d 275 (Okla. 1961).
14. See, e.g., 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND
856-58 (4th ed. with analysis by T. Cooley 1899); L. JONES, CHATTEL MORT-
GAGES 516 (1881); 2 F. POLLOCK & W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 574 (2d ed. 1968). Early American cases include O'Fallon v. Elliott,
1 Mo. 364 (1823); Hall v. Snowhill, 14 N.J.L. 8 (1833); Moody v. Haseldon, 1
S.C. 129 (1869).
15. See, e.g., Ellis v. Smithers, 206 Ark. 247, 174 S.W.2d 568 (1943);
Harvey v. Anacone, 134 Me. 245, 184 A. 889 (1936); Burtis v. Bradford, 122
Mass. 129 (1877); Wendell v. N.H. Bank, 9 N.H. 404 (1838).
[VOL. 1973:503
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rational pattern that consists of Shelley v. Kraemer,'6 Evans v. Ab-
ney,' 7 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 8 and Moose Lodge
v. Irvis' 9 will not succeeed. This case does not fit the pattern of
those cases, and none clearly dictates the outcome here. One hopes
only that the Court will follow the pattern that it may have estab-
lished in Moose Lodge v. Irvis, a pattern of greater hesitance to
turn every issue into a constitutional case.
If the Court finds no state action here and thus upholds the con-
stitutionality of section 9-503, the outcome can coexist comforta-
bly with Fuentes v. Shevin. In that case there was undisputed and
extensive state action. One must pay a filing fee to start his re-
plevin action, file his pleadings, and invoke the action of the court
before anything can happen.20  Commonly the writ of replevin is
served by an officer of the state, and the property is seized and
held by an officer of the state. 21 In short, the state is fully and
16. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
17. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
18. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
19. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
20. Florida's replevin statute, which was declared unconstitutional in
Fuentes, reads as follows:
Right to Replevin. Any person whose goods or chattels are wrong-
fully detained by any other person or officer may have a writ of
replevin to recover them and any damages sustained by reason of
the wrongful caption or detention as herein provided. Or such per-
son may seek like relief, but with summons to defendant instead
of replevy writ in which event no bond is required and the prop-
erty shall be seized only after judgment, such judgment to be in like
form as that provided when defendant has retaken the property
on a forthcoming bond.
FLA. STAT. § 78.01 (1969).
Michigan has replaced its replevin provisions with the following
law, characterized as a "claim and delivery" statute:
. (1) A civil action may be brought to recovery any goods or
chattels which have been unlawfully taken or unlawfully detained
and to recover damages sustained by the unlawful taking or un-
lawful detention, except as provided below.(a) No action may be maintained under this provision for any
property taken by virtue of any warrant for the collection of any tax,
assessment, or fine in pursuance of any statute of this state.
• (b) No action may be maintained under this provision to recover
goods or chattels seized by virtue of any execution or attachment at
the suit of the defendant in the execution or attachment unless the
goods or chattels are exempted by law from execution or attachment.
(c) No action may be maintained under this provision by any
person who does not at that time have a right to possession of the
goods taken or detained.(3) If the merchant repossesses or accepts voluntary surren-
der of goods which were not subject of the sale but in which he has
a security interest to secure a debt arising from a sale of goods or
services or a combined sale of goods and services and the amount
owing at the time of default was $1,000 or less, the customer is not
personally liable to the merchant for the unpaid balance of the debt
arising from the sale, and the merchant's duty to dispose of the col-
lateral is governed by the provisions on disposition of collateral un-
der chs. 401 to 409.
MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2920 (1948).
21. Florida's provisions relating to the execution of the writ of replevin
NUMBER 2]
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deeply involved in the typical replevin action in a way in which it
is not involved in self-help repossession.
II. WAIVER
In the dissenting opinion in Fuentes v. Shevin, Justice White sug-
gested that the creditor could avoid the impact not only of that de-
cision but also of any similar subsequent ruling on section 9-503 by
the inclusion of a waiver clause in its security agreement. He ar-
gued as follows:
The Court's rhetoric is seductive, but in the end analysis,
the result it reaches will have little impact and represents
no more than ideological tinkering with state law. It
would appear that creditors could withstand attack under
today's opinion simply by making clear in the controlling
credit instruments that they may retake possession...
without resort to judicial process at all.2 2
Such a clause currently included in one bank's security agreement
reads as follows:
Buyer is aware of the right to a judicial hearing before le-
gal process to retake possession of the good may be issued
and buyer waives such hearing. On default, seller or its
assignee may obtain a replevin warrant or other process
without notice to buyer and without a prior hearing.
Of course it is settled that one can waive his constitutional rights.
Even if he is accused of a crime and therefore entitled to the high-
est measure of constitutional protection, a knowing and uncoerced
waiver will be effective.23  Surely no one would complain in the
car repossession case if the debtor called up and instructed the
are as follows. FLA. STAT. § 78.08 (1969):
WRIT; FORM; RETURN.-The writ shall command the officer
to whom it may be directed to replevy the goods and chattles in
possession of defendant, describing them, and to summon the de-
fendant to answer the complaint.
Id. § 78.13 provides:
WRIT; DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY LEVIED ON.-The of-
ficer executing the writ shall deliver the property to plaintiff after
the lapse of three days from the time the property was taken un-
less within the three days defendant gives bond with surety to be
approved by the officer in double the value of the property as ap-
praised by the officer, conditioned to have the property forthcoming
to abide the result of the action, in which event the property shall be
redelivered to defendant.
22. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 102 (1972) (White, J., dissenting).
23. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (waiver of
right to trial); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (consent to a
search); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942)
(waiver of right to counsel). In the noncriminal area it has been held that
one may waive the right to actual notice: National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v.
Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964). The most recent relevant case is D. H.
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), in which the Supreme Court
held that the confession of judgment provisions in the cognovit notes there
before it did not violate the due process clause.
[VOL. 1973:503
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creditor to come and get his automobile. But the question remains,
is the waiver clause included in the security agreement tantamount
to a knowing and contemporaneous waiver?
I suspect that Justice White is too facile. Nothing in the majo-
ity opinion suggests that those four Justices are willing to go along
on a Waiver argument in consumer replevin cases. Indeed when
they speak of waiver, they add a number of other conditions. 24
To say that self-help repossession is unconstitutional when there is
no waiver clause, but that even a prominent waiver clause renders
it constitutional, is to be excessively cynical. How many of us read
the agreements that we sign? Even among law students and law-
yers-those most acutely aware of contract liability-how many
read the agreements that they sign as consumers? Though I know
of no reliable empirical data on the subject, my guess is that few of
us read form agreements and many who do read them do not under-
stand their import. rn short, I dispute the proposition that one who
has signed a security agreement containing a waiver clause, even a
clause in big and colorful print, is really in a different position
than is one who has signed a security agreement that contains no
such waiver clause.
It may be that consumers understand more about repossession
than lawyers and judges do, and that in fact they expect that an au-
tomobile will be repossessed if they cease payments, but my guess
is that a clause in a security agreement, even a clause that must be
separately initialed and printed in red, does little to increase that
understanding. As a practical matter I would class such persons
together with those who have signed an agreement that did not
contain such a waiver.
Thus if my empirical judgments are right, accepting waiver as a
way around Adams v. Egley is an essentially dishonest route to
the proper end.25 Because such clauses will appear overnight in
24. The majority opinion in Fuentes rejected the contention that Mrs.
Fuentes had waived her right to assert any defenses when she signed
the sales contract. The Court readily distinguished the factual situation in
Fuentes from that in Overmyer and suggested several criteria for a valid
waiver:
The facts of the present cases are a far cry from those of
Overmyer. There was no bargaining over contractual terms be-
tween the parties who, in any event, were far from equal in bar-
gaining power. The purported waiver provision was a printed part
of a form sales contract and a necessary condition of the sale. The
appellees made no showing whatever that the appellants were ac-
tually aware or made aware of the significance of the fine print now
relied upon as a waiver of constitutional rights.
407 U.S. at 95. In addition, the Court found that the language contained in
the contract in Fuentes did not constitute a valid waiver because such lan-
guage "must, at the very least, be clear" and must, "on its face, amount to
a waiver." Id. (emphasis in original).
25. Some imaginative creditor-lawyers known to me have suggested
several provisions to their clients that may in fact communicate the nec-
essary information to the debtor and, in combination with other proced-
NUMBER 2)
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the appropriate size, shape, and color in the boiler plate of every
consumer security interest in the country, their acceptance as a suf-
ficient constitutional answer is tantamount to a reversal of the
Fuentes case.
III. DUE PROCESS
The Supreme Court has frequently acknowledged the proposition
that a due process judgment requires a court to balance the sup
posed benefits to the individual that would arise from due process
against the public costs arising from the institution of the proposed
procedure. Although it has continued to pay lip service to this. bal-
ancing proposition in the creditor-debtor cases, in fact it has given
short shrift to the creditors' balancing arguments. In its most re-
cent statement in Fuentes v. Shevin, the Court finds that "notice
and an opportunity for hearing" may be postponed, but only in sit-
uations that are "truly unusual. '2 6  The Court then cites several
circumstances under which seizure of property will be permitted
without a prior hearing or notice, i.e., cases in which the individ-
ual's right is outweighed by the public cost. Among these are
seizures on behalf of the United States for the collection of taxes,27
to meet the needs of a national war effort, 28 to prevent a bank
failure, 29 and to protect the public from misbranded drugs and
contaminated food.30 In addition the Court recognizes that prop-
erty may be seized "to secure jurisdiction in state court. ' 3 1 In the
ures, may overcome the objections even of the majority in the Fuentes case.
One lawyer has proposed first that his client have the debtor sign a waiver
on a separate sheet of paper. The waiver is explicit and it states on its
face the signing of the waiver is not a condition to procuring the loan:
Second, he has advised his creditor-client to give the debtor written notice
of a prospective repossession and to send him a stamped self-addressed card
with instructions for the debtor to return the card with any explanation
he might have for his failure to pay. This procedure seems as careful
as one can devise; still I am skeptical about the significance of any docu-
ment signed at the time of purchase. My guess is that the typical con-
sumer is so anxious to drive away in his new car that even the slightest
suggestion that failure to sign the waiver might hold up the process
will cause him to sign such a waiver. In these circumstances, his
waiver may be knowing but it is not likely to be bargained for. In short,
I remain unconvinced by the waiver aspect of the procedure described
above. More intriguing is the notice of prospective repossession and the
request for explanation of nonpayment. Perhaps in the hands of a good
faith lender that procedure should be accepted as a substitute for a ju-
dicial hearing.
26. 407 U.S. at 90.
27. Id. at 92 n.24, citing Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
28. 407 U.S. at 92 n.25, citing United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547(1946); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1922); Central Union Trust Co. v.
Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921).
29. 407 U.S. at 92 n.26, citing Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1946).
30. 407 U.S. at 92 n.27, 28, citing Erving v. Mytinger v. Casselberry, Inc.,
339 U.S. 594 (1949); North Am. Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).31. 407 U.S. at 91 n.23, citing Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
[VoL. 1973:503
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footnotes the Court finds that the costs to the public in time, ef-
fort, and expense of holding hearings are "rather ordinary costs"
that "cannot outweigh the constitutional right. '32 It goes on in a
subsequent footnote further to demean the public interest by de-
scribing it as the "private gain at stake in repossession actions."38
It is my thesis that the Court's weighing of the factors in Fuentes
v. Shevin is not properly done, and that the Court's characteriza-
tion of one party's interest as "private gain" and of the costs as
''rather ordinary" suggests either that the Court's economics is weak
or that it is blinded by its bias in favor of the consumer. The labels
that the Court puts on the costs and the benefits of "ordinary"
and "private" may well be misleading on both scores. As we shall
see, the costs of doing away with self-help repossession and of sub-
stituting some form of replevin will be unquestionably significant,
perhaps enormous. If the adjective "private" is meant to convey
the idea that any changes here will not go beyond the creditors'
profit and loss statements, the Court is probably wrong. Rather,
these costs will ultimately be borne by the consumer class itself, a
class presumably to be benefited by the added protection. It is
time that the Court ceased due process balancing simply by assign-
ing appropriately pejoriative labels to the losers and instead en-
gaged in a serious attempt to measure the costs and the benefits.
How should the Court measure the costs and the benefits? At
least on the California market, there is considerable information at
hand, and with the help of an assumption or two one can make some
reasonable guesses about the nationwide costs and benefits. In a n
attempt to evaluate the costs I would ask at least the following
questions:
(1) In what percentage of all the secured loans does the
creditor attempt to repossess by self-help?
(2) How effective is self-help repossession in acquiring
possession of the car by comparison with judicial reposses-
sion?
(3) How does the cost of self-help repossession compare
with the cost of judicial repossession?
(4) To the extent that there are added costs, who will bear
them?
(5) If creditors had to go to court to repossess, would they
seek deficiency judgments more frequently than they do
now?
(6) Are private repossessors more or less likely to disturb
the privacy and upset the life of the debtor than are offi-
cial repossessors?
On the other side of the ledger are some questions the answers
32. 407 U.S. at 90 n.22.
33. Id. at 92 n.29.
NUMBER 2J"
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to which will illustrate the benefit to individual debtors of due
process hearings:
(1) How often are goods repossessed from debtors who are
not in default?
(2) Among those debtors in default at the time of repos-
session, how many have defenses that they could assert at
a hearing which would cause a judge to allow them to keep
the car pending the outcome of the trial on the deficiency
or debt?
(3) Among these debtors with such defenses, how many
will assert them?
To set the stage for an analysis of the data, consider first the two
polar scenarios of what might occur following a finding that self-
help repossession is unconstitutional. The creditors' scenario is
likely to go as follows: Virtually all of our repossessions were done
by self-help. Almost all of those repossessions will have to be done
judicially now and that will increase our costs on a massive scale.
In the first place, we now repossess nearly one out of 10 cars; many
debtors skip and a prerepossession court notice will cause others to
skip. We will have to pay not only a court entry fee, a service fee,
and a sizable lawyer's fee, but we will also have to pay to send a
witness to court for a hearing and to send an employee along with
the sheriff to tow the car in. In addition we will have to pay a tow-
ing company and pay the sheriff mileage and time. Since the
court process will inevitably be delayed, we will have a considera-
ble opportunity cost in that we will not get our money back as
quickly as we would otherwise. Our experience indicates that one
debtor out of a thousand will come to court and that one debtor out
of 2,000 will have some meritorious defense. The rest may have
some complaint that might conceivably give them a setoff against
the judgment, but will not allow them to retain the car. Moreover
since we will already have paid the entry fee and be in court we
will seek a deficiency judgment in every case (now we seek a de-
ficiency in only two out of nine cases). On the other hand we will
welcome the sheriff's right to break down the doors to get at the
collateral, a right that we have not formerly enjoyed because our
repossessions have not been under color of law. We will pass on the
added costs in several ways. First of all we will raise the interest
charges; second, we will require considerably higher down pay-
ments and thus force some new car buyers into the used car mar-
ket where we can typically charge considerably higher interest
rates; and we eliminate credit to some of the lower class, unskilled
workers who are marginal credit risks.
The debtors' scenario might go as follows: The limitation on
private repossession will prevent dishonest creditors from repos-
sessing a car from a debtor who is not in default. Moreover it
will give a debtor, who has a good cause of action against the
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seller, an opportunity to present that cause of action at a hearing
and to prove that after the setoff he is not in default and thus
has no obligation to give up the automobile. It will keep the
private repossessors from doing nasty things like luring people out
of their houses so that their cars can be snatched. And of course
it will enable us to keep our cars, cars which we need to get to
work, and which are in fact our life's blood. Moreover the creditors
will find ways of conducting cheap replevins, and procedures can
be designed to minimize the costs of replevins.
To assess which of these scenarios is closer to the truth, one can
examine the answers to the questions posed above.
A. The Costs of Judicial Repossession
1. IN WHAT PERCENTAGE OF ALL SECURITY INTERESTS DOES THE
CREDITOR ATTEMPT TO REPOSSESS BY SELF-HELP?
If creditors either rely exclusively on judicial repossessions or if
they repossess in only one loan out of 500,000, self-help is doubtless
unimportant to them, and denial of the right of self-help would not
significantly increase their costs. In the first place, it appears that
when one speaks of self-help repossession he is talking mostly of
automobiles and that virtually all repossession of automobiles is
done by self-help.34 That is, creditors who choose to repossess
washing machines, refrigerators, and other household goods must
usually resort to judicial repossession in any event because the
crossing of the threshold uninvited will constitute a breach of the
peace and is therefore not permitted by section 9-503 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.35 On the other hand, snatching a car off
the street at night does not constitute a breach of the peace 36 and
is the common method of picking up cars. 37 The Johnson study
showed the number of replevins of cars to be infinitesimal. 8
Seven banks responding to a consumer bankers association report
disclosed only 15 replevins during 1971. A major finance company
reported that replevins amounted to less than one percent of its
total United States repossessions, excluding Louisiana.3 9 Thus re-
possession of a car is likely to be by self-help, not by replevin.
34. R. Johnson, supra note 6, at 18.
35. See Crews & Green v. Parker, 192 Ala. 383, 68 So. 287 (1915) (furni-
ture from debtor's restaurant); Cecil Baber Elec. Co. v. Brier, 183 Okla. 541,
83 P.2d 598 (1938) (refrigerator from "premises"); Lark v. Cooper Furniture
Co., 114 S.C. 37, 102 S.E. 786 (1920) (furniture from home). See generally
White, Representing the Low Income Consumer in Repossessions, Resales,
and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 808 (1970).
36. See, e.g., King v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 140 F. Supp. 259
(M.D. N.C. 1956); McWaters v. Gardner, 37 Ala. App. 418, 69 So.2d 724
(1954); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sheuy, 243 Ky. 74, 47 S.W.2d
968 (1932). See also cases cited in Annot., 146 A.L.R. 1331 (1943).
37. White, supra note 35.
38. R. Johnson, supra note 6, at 18.
39. Id.
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It is still possible that there are so few repossessions per 1,000
loans that creditors could stand a considerable increase in cost per
repossession without incurring any substantial aggregate increase
in costs. The Johnson study indicates that about 5.5 percent of the
new California car contracts and about 10.5 percent of the used
California car contracts ultimately result in repossession. An ear-
lier study had shown a slightly higher nationwide repossession
rate.40  If one extrapolates from the more recent Johnson figures
and assumes that they are a fairly representative image of the na-
tionwide market, he concludes that there were approximately
960,000 total repossessions of automobiles in the United States last
year, a considerable number by any standard. Thus if the costs
per repossession of changing from a self-help to a judicial repos-
session method is anything but modest, the aggregate costs will be
great indeed, for that cost per repossession must be multiplied
by 960,000. 41
2. HOW EFFECTIVE IS SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION IN
COMPARISON WITH JUDICIAL REPOSSESSION?
Some argue 42 that the service of a complaint on the debtor that
discloses he is about to lose his car will cause him to skip and will
40. P. MCCRAcKEN, J. MAO & C. FRICKE, CONSUMER INSTALLMENT CREDIT
AND PUBLIC POLICY 129 (1965).
41. The figures in Federal Reserve Board Release No. A-56 (June, 1972)
reveal $38,762,000,000 in automobile paper outstanding at the end of
March, 1972. Federal Reserve Board figures also reveal that the average
contract outstanding is $1606. Telephone conversation with Robert W.
Johnson. Using these figures, one can derive the total number of contracts
outstanding in the United States-approximately 24.1 million contracts.
Johnson's figures indicate that in California 4.8% of all contracts out-
standing result in repossessions. This figure is probably slightly too high
for a national average. Ford Motor Company officials testifying in Mes-
senger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., Civil No. C929-71 (N.J Super. Ct., Union,
Cty., Sept. 29, 1972), estimate that repossessions nationally constitute 4%
of all contracts outstanding. Multiplying 4% by the total number of con-
tracts outstanding in the United States (24.1 million as of March, 1972) re-
sults in the figure of approximately 960,000 repossessions.
If the Federal Reserve Board figure of $1606 is inaccurate, all of our cal-
culations are thrown out of line. The figure is consistent with the com-
parable figure provided for the year 1971 by Ford Motor credit. The aver-
age principal amount of the contracts outstanding with Ford at the end of
1971 was $1949.17. The fact that the Ford figure is higher is probably at-
tributable to the fact that a larger percentage of all of Ford's contracts are
written on new cars than is true nationwide. Letter from Ford Motor
Credit Co. to James J. White.
The estimate of 960,000 repossessions is probably still slightly high. As
the costs to the creditors go up because they are denied self-help reposses-
sion, creditors will surely add some part of those costs to the price of the
cars in the form of higher down payments or higher interest payments.
These added costs will result in a somewhat smaller number of sales of cars
on credit and accordingly will cause at least a modest reduction in the total
number of repossessions.
42. R. Johnson, supra note 6, at 32.
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thus move the car out of the creditor's reach and so effectively bar
him from recovering the value of the automobile. In the face of
Professor Johnson's facts concerning creditor contacts with the
debtor prior to repossession, it seems unlikely that a debtor who
will stick around and stand up to standard private collection ef-
forts will skip on the receipt of court papers. The Johnson study
shows that the average repossession is preceded by no fewer than
30 contacts between the creditor and the debtor.43  Some of these
contacts may have occurred on delinquencies that did not cause
repossession but which were worked out, yet it appears that most
debtors are willing to stay put and hold on to the car in the face of
two dozen increasingly aggressive and forceful collection contacts.
As these collection efforts rise to their crescendo, it must be ap-
parent even to the stupid debtor that he is on the verge of losing
his car, and that if he wishes to keep it he had better skip. I am un-
persuaded that a debtor who can withstand that kind of private
collection effort will be motivated to skip by the receipt of court
papers.
If some debtors are motivated to skip by the receipt of court
papers, others may be motivated to pay by receipt of such papers.
Some creditors apparently think that the receipt of court papers
causes the debtors to pay up, for in several cases known to me4 4
creditors have designed their collection notices to look like plead-
ings.
3. HOW DOES THE COST OF SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION COMPARE
WITH THE COST OF JUDICIAL REPOSSESSION?
Professor Johnson identifies two costs not present in self-help
repossession that will arise in judicial repossession cases. First are
court costs: The entry fee, the attorney's fee, service fee, and the
cost of sending a witness to the initial hearing to establish a prima
43. A survey by Consumers Bankers Association in Washington, D.C.,
on pre-repossession activity in 1971 revealed the following average activity
preceding each repossession:
Number of Written extensions or rewrites 3.6
Delinquency notices sent 10.3
Telephone calls 12.2
Personal contacts 7.9
Total 34.0
R. Johnson, supra note 6, at 17. Johnson suggests that, because this informa-
tion was taken from a group of small banks, the average number of personal
contacts in this study may be higher than the national average of all pre-
repossesson activity.
44. In several cases that have passed through the Washtenaw County
Legal Aid Office in Ann Arbor, Michigan, the debtor brought in a dunning
notice that was designed to look like a complaint. At the top left corner of
the notice the debtor's name was printed and below that was the creditor's
name with the letters "vs." between them. The apparent intention was to
lead the debtor to believe that he was receiving not just a routine dun-
ning letter, but a complaint that had been filed in court.
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facie case. Second are the costs resulting from the delay in re-
possession that will inevitably arise from having to go through a
judicial proceeding. To the extent that these latter costs are quan-
tifiable, they arise from the continuing depreciation in the value of
the automobile and from the opportunity cost of being deprived of
the sum the automobile will bring on resale for an additional pe-
riod of time. He estimates the quantifiable costs as follows: 45
New Cars Used Cars
Initial Entry Fee
Legal fees and court costs $150 $150
(rough estimate)
Costs of 30-day delay:
Depreciation in value $ 57 $ 31
Opportunity cost $ 24 $ 8
Other + +
$231-- $189+
Marginal Replevin Costs
Legal fees, court costs,
and sheriff $250-300 $250-300
Cost of 30-day delay $ 81 + $ 39 +
Totals $331-381 ' $289-339-+
The top set of costs labelled "Initial Entry Fee" assumes that a
complaint will be filed, and a hearing date set; those costs make no
provision for the cost of the hearing or seizure. The bottom set la-
belled "Marginal Replevin Costs" assumes that one will not only
file, but that a representative of the creditor will go to the hearing
and give testimony to prove a prima facie case and get some form
of default judgment. The bottom set assumes that repossession
will be made promptly by the sheriff or other state official and that
the debtor will raise no defenses. These figures omit consideration
of the so-called nonquantifiable costs, costs attributable to the
fact that a finance company or bank employee may accompany the
sheriff to identify the car, that the car may be towed instead of
driven away, that it will be stored, not at the bank or finance
company's lot, but at a state lot where a fee must be paid, and that
a bond may have to be put up to indemnify the debtor against
injury done him in the course of the repossession. There is also
the cost to the taxpayers of conducting these repossessions in the
courts-clerks, judges, and bailiffs do not work for free.
Are Professor Johnson's estimates plausible? His estimates of
attorney's fees come from an actual experience in Louisiana (where
there is no self-help repossession 46) and from estimates by Califor-
45. R. Johnson, supra note 6.
46. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:4562-9:4564, 13:3851 (1951) and cases such as
Brandeson v. International Harvester Corp., 66 So.2d 317 (La. 1953), and
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nia law firms. He estimates that the legal fees and court costs in-
volved in drafting the complaint, filing it, paying the entry fee and
the service fees would be approximately $150 per case. It seems un-
likely that one can file the suit and serve the complaint for much
less than $30.47 That leaves $120 for the lawyer, who by hypothesis
will do nothing here but draft the complaint. That is, here we as-
sume that the lawyer never appears in court and has to prepare no
witnesses or testimony, for we are first considering the cases in
which the debtor voluntarily gives up the car before the hearing
but after he is served. If the lawyer in question is a collection
expert, he will have a battery of highly trained secretaries and he
may use form complaints. It is likely that these secretaries can
turn out complaints on the basis of the files furnished by the client
and that the only lawyer time involved will be his signing of the
complaint. 48 Surely this service is not worth $120 and consumer
creditors are not likely to pay an inflated value for lawyer service.
Indeed it is possible to conceive of an operation in which an hour
of lawyer's work charged at $35 to $50 would produce 10, or per-
haps 20 complaints and that the total amount billed in such cases
would be only five dollars per complaint. Thus it is hard to under-
stand where Professor Johnson got his California estimates which
range from $165 to $220 and how the lawyers effectively charge a
minimum of $75 and a maximum of $150 for that service in 45 ac-
tual cases that he studied in Louisiana. Since those cases were
taken from a number of parishes throughout Louisiana, it is possible
that they were handled in a more traditional fashion and not by a
mass producer of the kind that more commonly work as collection
lawyers for a consumer finance organization. At least for cases in
which the creditor has an experienced collection lawyer who is
dealing in bulk, it is possible that Professor Johnson has substan-
tially overestimated the legal fees. If one assumes that half of
Morelock v. Morgan & Bird Gravel Co., 174 La. 658, 141 So. 368 (1932), for a
listing of the seller's rights under Louisiana law.
47. Filing fees to initiate a suit for replevin of course vary from state
to state. For example, in Michigan the filing fee is $12 if the amount in
controversy is over $50 and five dollars if not. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.8371
(1948). In New Jersey, the court fees for filing are eight dollars if the
amount in controversy does not exceed $500 and $10 if it does. N.J. REV.
STAT. § 22A:2-37 (1969).
Fees for utilizing the sheriff's services vary greatly from state to
state. In New York City the sheriff's fee for serving a summons is $5 and for
the actual levy is $25 plus mileage at 10 cents a mile. In New Jersey the
cost of the summons and writ varies with the amount in controversy and
whether or not the writ is served with the summons. It can be as little as
$9.50 if the value of the goods is under $500 and the writ is served with
the summons. It can be as much as $17.50 if the amount exceeds $500 and
the writ is issued subsequent to the summons. The sheriff's mileage must
be paid at 10 cents a mile. N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 22A:2-37 to 38 (1969).
48. Indeed I know of some operations under which the lawyer signs a
bundle of uncompleted form complaints and gives them to the client for
his clerical help to file after they have filled them in.
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all the cases are handled on a production line basis at $10 per com-
plaint and that the others are handled in a more conventional fash-
ion at $75 to $100 per complaint, he might reduce the aggregate
rough estimate of legal fees from $150 to $80 or perhaps even to a
figure as low as $70 or $60.
The remainder of Professor Johnson's assumptions set forth in
the table above are less readily challenged. To arrive at the depre-
ciation in value he assumes that the judicial proceedings postpone
the repossession beyond the self-help time by an average of 30 days.
This seems a reasonable assumption. When the creditor decides to
repossess he must file his complaint, serve it, and then wait the
statutory period for an answer. Of course neither the filing nor
the service will occur on the same day the creditor decides to re-
possess, and default day at the local court will not necessarily fall
on the exact date when the answer is due. Thus it would seem :to
me that this 30-day estimate is conservative and that, if anything,
judicial repossession is likely to cause more than 30 days of delay.49
The creditor's quickness might change this result. That is, if a
creditor knew that he would have a 30-day delay, he might com-
mence judicial proceedings earlier than he would have repossessed.
Working against this is the fact that money spent on judicial pro-
ceedings is irretrievable, and the creditor is not likely to put up
this filing and legal fee simply as a bargaining ploy with the
thought that the suit can be readily dropped. The acute cost con-
sciousness of the typical consumer creditor is likely to keep him
from filing a complaint and incurring the costs of filing, service,
and lawyer's fees until he is confident that he cannot work out an
arrangement with the debtor. Thus, in my judgment Professor
Johnson's estimate of 30 days is sound and probably conservative.
To reach his conclusion on depreciation Professor Johnson esti-
mates the average cash price of a new car ($4,320), a down payment
of $800, and an unpaid balance of $3,520. He then assumes that the
car depreciates 5 percent of its value in the first month after the
sale and thereafter depreciates two percent each month. Using
the available data on the time when cars are most commonly repos-
sessed and weighting the amounts accordingly, he then concludes
that on the average, new cars will depreciate $57 in the 30-day
49. In Michigan the statutory period for an answer is 15 days after
service of process. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 108.1. In Wisconsin, under the newly
passed Wisconsin Consumer Act, a consumer buyer is afforded at least 75
days after first missing a payment before the collateral may be repossessed.
The 75-day period would occur as follows: default is defined as taking place
40 days after missing a payment in most cases. WiS. STAT. § 425.103 (1971).
Further, the seller must then give notice to the consumer-buyer giving him
15 days to cure the default. Id. § 425.104. If the buyer does not cure, the
seller may then commence an action. Id. §§ 425.105, 425.205(6). Then the
consumer-buyer would have 20 days to answer the complaint. Id. § 263.05.
Adding time for service, the period will probably be 90 days or longer.
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period and used cars will depreciate $31.50 Of course, this approach
is filled with assumptions, but his assumptions seem generally ac-
curate and conservative. One assumption with which a person
could argue is his use of the retail value as a basis for depreciation.
In fact the typical repossessor will sell the car on the wholesale
market 5' and in the 30 days during which he will be deprived of
the automobile he will not lose two percent of the retail value,
but two percent of the wholesale value. It seems likely therefore
that the depreciation figure will be somewhat lower than the $57
and $31 for new and used cars, respectively.5 2 Using wholesale
figures then, a closer approximation would be $48 and $26 for new
and used cars, respectively. To a certain extent Professor John-
son's questionable use of the retail as opposed to the wholesale
value is offset by the fact that cars about to be repossessed proba-
bly depreciate more rapidly than those not in jeopardy. As he
points out, a hard-pressed debtor who knows that his car is on the
verge of repossession will probably not maintain and repair it as
carefully as will one whose car is not about to be repossessed.
I cannot quarrel with Professor Johnson's calculation of the op-
portunity costs. He concludes that the average new car will ulti-
mately produce $2,160 on resale by the repossession, that the credi-
tor will forego the opportunity to reinvest this amount for 30 days,
and that he will so lose an average of $15 per new car. The similar
computation for used cars produces only $8 because the typical
used car has a lesser value.
To arrive at the aggregate incremental expense in California from
instituting an exclusively judicial repossession method, Professor
Johnson has to make certain assumptions about the proportion of
new and used cars that are sold and repossessed. Professor John-
son assumes a repossession rate of 5.5 percent on new cars and 10.5
percent on used cars (i.e., five or six out of every 100 new cars fi-
nanced will be repossessed). Assuming that each of the 66,000 es-
timated repossessions in California in 1971 arose only after the
commencement of a replevin suit, he estimated the total incremen-
50. R. Johnson, supra note 6, at 43.
51. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-507, Comment 2 reads in part-
"One recognized method of disposing of repossessed collateral is for the
secured party to sell the collateral to or through a dealer-a method which
in the long run may realize better average returns since the secured party
does not usually maintain his own facilities for making such sales." For
a study of the problem of secured creditor's selling below market value in
the wholesale market, see Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival
Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REv. 20 (1969).
52. Figures taken from the NATIONAL MARKET REPORTS, REDBOOK (1972)
reveal that wholesale prices average $400 to $500 less than retail for med-
ium-priced cars less than 4 years old. For example a 1972 Pontiac Catalina
had a retail value in November of 1972 of $2875, but a wholesale value of
$2350. A 1971 Oldsmobile in November of 1972 retailled for $2475, but
had a wholesale value of $2075. A 1970 Pontiac Delta had a retail value
of $2050, but a wholesale value of $1525.
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tal cost of instituting judicial repossession to be $13,500,000. To ar-
rive at that figure, he assumes that a default hearing would have
to be held in about 40 percent of the cases and that in those cases a
state official would seize the car and tow it in. He assumes that
the debtor would give up the car before the hearing in the other
60 percent of the cases. On those assumptions he concludes that
the total marginal cost, not only of instituting but also of going
through with the hearings and repossessions in 40 percent of the
cases, would have exceeded $16,000,000 for the year 1971. At least
on a nationwide basis it is unclear whether Professor Johnson's as-
sumptions about the costs of having a hearing are correct. In the
Fuentes opinion the Court explicitly states that there is no consti-
tutional requirement for a court hearing when the debtor de-
faults.5 3 Some states now require the plaintiff to give testimony
-in open court before he procures a default; other states permit the
plaintiff to take a default on an affidavit and without a court ap-
pearance. At least in those states which authorize defaults without
court appearance, the costs per repossession in those cases in which
the debtor does not voluntarily give up the car before a hearing
will be less than those estimated by Professor Johnson.
Professor Johnson assumes that no car will be repossessed with-
out the institution of legal proceedings. Under Adams v. Egley
it is not clear where one draws the line between an impermissible
self-help repossession and the voluntary, and therefore permissible,
return of the car by the debtor to the creditor. Even under Adams
v. Egley a debtor who decides that he cannot make his payments
would be permitted to return his car. In such circumstances a
creditor would not have to undertake judicial proceedings. How
far a creditor can go to stimulate a "voluntary" return under
Adams v. Egley is unclear. Can he ask that the debtor return the
car? Can he send a couple of 250-pound gorillas to the debtor's
residence to request the return of the car? Presumably at least a
fraction of the repossessions that are now characterized as volun-
tary by Professor Johnson could be undertaken without the insti-
tution of judicial proceedings even under Adams v. Egley. To that
extent his estimate of the costs is overstated. On the other hand
he assumes that the debtor would give up his car after the institu-
tion of proceedings and before a hearing in six out of ten reposses-
sion cases. That asumption may be too generous to the debtors; it
is equally plausible that many of these debtors will keep their cars
until the hearing date has passed and someone comes for the car.
If one assumes that (1) repossessions occur on four percent of the
outstanding contracts nationwide; and (2) the total number of out-
standing contracts in the country is 24.1 million, and applies our
estimates to the nationwide market, the nationwide incremental
53. 407 U.S. at 92 n.29.
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cost of replacing self-help repossession with replevin for 1971
would have been approximately $143 million.5 4
Of course these estimates do not take into account the costs that
are certainly present but are much more difficult to quantify:
costs of the hearing when the debtor does not default, cost of send-
ing a man along to locate the car, storage fees, bond, cost of towing.
On the other hand, Professor Johnson gives no offsetting credit
for the cost now incurred that will not have to be incurred in the
replevin case, namely, the cost of the private repossessor. It is pos-
sible that the cost will not be saved, but will be equaled in replevin
cases by the towing charge, but it seems likely that the creditor
will enjoy some savings.
One should not be misled by what I have done above. I quarrel
with none of Professor Johnson's fundamental points; I quarrel
only with some of his assumptions. Even if one makes the most
conservative estimates of added costs-if he assumes that sheriffs
work for little, that each creditor can find a highly efficient and
inexpensive collection lawyer, that the cars will not depreciate as
greatly as Professor Johnson has assumed-one still comes out with
a tremendous cost. According to our calculations the annual incre-
mental cost of substituting standard replevin for self-help re-
possession is certainly not less than $9.5 million for California or
54. Approximately one-third of all repossessions are new cars and two-
thirds are used cars. See Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., Civil No. C929-
71 (N.J. Super. Ct., Union Cty., Sept. 29, 1972); P. MCCRACKEN, J. MAO, & C.
FRICKE, supra note 40; R. Johnson, supra note 6. Using the estimate of
960,000 repossessions computed in note 41, supra, as a national figure, this
would mean about 320,000 new cars repossessed and 640,000 used cars.
Johnson's table as to "Initial Entry fees," that is, the fees that a plain-
tiff-company would have to pay to repossess even if the debtor volun-
tarily surrendered his car, could be revised downward to the following
figures:
New Car Used Car
Legal fees and court costs $60 $60
Costs of 30 day delay:
Depreciation in value 48 26
Opportunity cost 20 6
Totals $128 $92
Multiplying these figures by our national data (320,000 x $128) and
(640,000 x $92.00) yields a result of about $100 million ($40,960,000 +
$58,888,000 = $99,840,000). This means that even if every debtor surren-
dered his car after an action of replevin was filed against him, the added
expense would be 100 million dollars.
Assuming, however, that Johnson's figures are correct in that 38% of
the debtors will not surrender the cars, but will force creditors to re-
plevy them (R. Johnson, supra note 6, at 36), then this additional expense
must be added on. If, as Johnson assumes, each additional actual replevin
would add $125 in costs, then the formula to determine this additional ex-
pense is 960,000 x .38 x $125.00. This yields a result of $43,350,000.
Added to the costs of the initial entry fees, this means that, as a con-
servative estimate, forcing creditors to use replevins would add about $143
million in cost.
NUMBER 2]
HeinOnline  -- 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 521 1973
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
$143 million for the nation as a whole.5 5 Under any analysis the
cost of depriving the creditor of self-help repossession is considera-
ble.
4. TO THE EXTENT THAT REPLEVIN CAUSES ADDED COSTS,
WHO WILL BEAR THEM? CAN THEY BE AVOIDED?
Creditors do not absorb additional significant costs without mak-
ing strenuous efforts to pass them on to others. Faced with added
costs, the creditors in the automobile market will have a variety of
options open to them. First they may simply raise their interest
rates and pass on the cost to the debtor car-buyer. If in some
states the usury limitations or the competition keeps them from
raising their interest rates,56 they may attempt to reduce their
losses by denying credit to those most likely to default or by reduc-
ing the likelihood of default by requiring a higher downpayment.
Indeed Professor Johnson points out the ironic way in which this
may work. The least creditworthy are typically unskilled workers
who have been on the job for only a short period of time. The
probability of nonpayment, even by the poorest credit risks, goes
down as the downpayment goes up.57 Since such a person will
have only limited funds for a downpayment, the requirement of a
higher downpayment may force him to buy a less expensive used
car or to borrow the money for the down payment from another
source. The other source is likely to be a consumer finance com-
pany that lends not at 11 or 12 percent but at 24 or 36 percent, and
if the customer must trade down to a used car he will probably
have to pay a significantly higher rate of interest than he would
55. Scaling down Johnson's cost figures for new cars from $231 to $128,
and for used cars from $189 to $92, means that the total cost of reposses-
sion will drop from his estimate of 16 million to our estimate of 9.5 mil-
lion (23,384 new car repossessions in California x $128 - $2,993,132; 42,616
used car repossessions x $92 = $3,920,652. Add to these figures his esti-
mate of $2,640,000 in added marginal replevin costs and the result is $9,553,-
784 in total expense.)
56. "At present, thirty-five states regulate finance charges on the in-
stalment sale of motor vehicles . . . ." Johnson, Regulation of Finance
Charges on Consumer Installment Credit, 66 MICH. L. REV. 81, 87 (1967). In
some states lenders are already lending at the maximum permitted rate,
but there are an equal or larger number where that is not so, at least as to
new cars.
57. In one study, G. MOORE & P. KLEIN, THE QUALITY OF CONSUMER
INSTALMENT CREDIT 82 (1967), the authors concluded: "High down-pay-
ment ratios have been consistently associated with a smaller degree of
subsequent collection difficulty." P. McCRACKEN, J. MAO, C. FRICKE, su-
pra note 40, at 136-39, also found that the higher the down payment, the
lower the repossession rate. See also White & Munger, Consumer Sensitiv-
ity to Interest Rates: An Empirical Study of New Car Buyers and Auto
Loans, 69 MiCH. L. REV. 1207 (1971) which discusses loan officer utilization
of this fact to keep default and hence repossessions at a low rate.
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on a new car.58
There are other options which Professor Johnson points out. In
some cases sellers may raise the cash price of automobiles to offset
the loss of earnings on credit sales. Where the usury limit has
been reached on one form of loan, the creditors may raise their
rates on other forms of loans to pay the cost of replevin. Each of
these latter creditor solutions is particularly offensive since it
causes the shift of the cost that should properly be borne by credit
buyers of cars to cash buyers or to credit buyers of other goods.
Of course it is possible that creditors can avoid some of the costs
by a more careful selection of their debtors. It is conceivable that
creditors under a new system would find it in their interest to re-
fuse to lend to their lowest stratum of debtor and thus save them-
selves the cost of replevin in a significant number of cases. One
should note the difficulties with such an approach however. No
creditor can identify in advance any debtor that will surely default.
Rather, he makes his loans on the basis of a profile made up of in-
come, debts, obligations, length of time on the job, etc. He knows
from experience that certain groups will contain a larger number
of defaulters than will other groups. In order to minimize his de-
faults he must either spend a greater amount in an attempt to re-
fine his classifications, or he must eliminate seven or eight debtors
who would pay in order to avoid two or three who would not pay.
Neither Professor Johnson nor anyone else that I know of offers
data on the utility of a more intensive credit check, or on the
ability of the automobile lenders to maintain their volume by di-
verting funds to other kinds of loans. If, as may well be the case,
the marginal costs for substantially improving his power to dis-
criminate among defaulting and nondefaulting debtors is great,
and if his capacity to maintain his volume by making loans in other
markets is limited, the creditor will surely seek other ways of
maintaining his volume as long as he can make a decent return
58. The Michigan rates on new and used cars afford an interesting com-
parison:
A seller licensed under the provisions of this act shall have the
power and authority to charge, contract for, receive or collect a fi-
nance charge, as defined in this act, on any installment sale con-
tract covering the retail sale of a motor vehicle in this state which
shall not exceed the rates indicated for the respective classification
of motor vehicles as follows:
Class I. Any new or used motor vehicle designated by the
manufacturer by a year model of the same or 1 year prior in which
the retail sale, then being financed, is made, $6.00 per $100.00 per
year.
Class II. New or used motor vehicles of a model designated by
the manufacturer by a year not more than 2 years prior to the year
in which the sale is made, $9.00 per $100.00 per year.
Class III. New or used motor vehicles of a model designated
by the manufacturer by a year more than 2 years prior to the year
in which the sale is made, $12.00 per $100.00 per year.
MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 492.118 (1948).
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rather than refusing to lend to a significant group of those to whom
he now lends. Nevertheless one can criticize Professor Johnson's
study for giving only limited consideration to the possibility that
creditors will find inexpensive ways of discovering and eliminating
prospective defaulters.
To the extent that creditors are unable to minimize the costs,
exactly who will bear them is uncertain. Surely the creditors will
leave no stone unturned in their attempt to pass on the costs to
their debtors. It seems likely that by hook or by crook they will
be successful in passing on these costs.
5. IF CREDITORS HAD TO GO TO COURT TO REPOSSESS, WOULD THEY
SEEK DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS MORE FREQUENTLY THAN THEY DO NOW?
Professor Johnson's data show that automobile creditors seek de-
ficiency judgments in only two out of every nine repossessions. "
Doubtless this failure in certain cases to seek deficiency judgments
represents an economic judgment on the part of the creditor that
the likely net proceeds from such an action will not equal the law-
yer's fee, the entry fee, and the service and collection fees. How-
ever if he is foreclosed from self-help repossession and, upon re-
possession by replevin, finds himself already in court having paid
a lawyer's, a service, and a filing fee, it may be economical for him
to go after a deficiency judgment in seven or eight out of 10 cases.
Strictly speaking, that result is not an added cost of the abolition
of self-help repossession and, theoretically at least, it reduces the
cost discussed above.60 However the study conducted by Professor
Shuchman indicates that there are substantial flaws in the defi-
ciency process and suggests that a debtor who is made to pay a de-
ficiency in fact pays more than he should under the circumstances
because the car is typically sold for less even than its wholesale
value, yet the deficiency is calculated by substracting the amount
due from the amount at which it is sold.6' If Professor Shuch-
59. The data were taken from a study of repossessions in the District of
Columbia by the National Commission on Consumer Finance. See Johnson,
Creditors' Remedies and Rate Ceilings Some Study Results of the National
Commission on Consumer Finance, 26 PERSONAL FINANCE L. Q.R. 65 (1972).
60. Professor Johnson concludes that the revenue derived from additional
deficiencies is likely to be small. Certainly that is consistent with my
experience in representing legal aid defendants. If the debtor has refused
to pay or been unable to pay in the face of threatened and ultimately ac-
tual repossession of his automobile, who is to say that he has the cash
available to pay a deficiency judgment? One plausible explanation for the
fact that the creditors choose to pursue deficiencies in only two out of nine
cases is that they make the correct economic judgment that in the other
seven cases their prospective return will be less than the cost of going for-
ward to judgment. Neither Professor Schuchman's article nor any other
study known to me holds out the prospect of grand returns on defici-
ency suits.
61. See Shuchman, supra note 51, at 31-34.
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man's conclusions about the Hartford market accurately portray
the market elsewhere, any due process procedure that stimulates
creditors to seek deficiencies has not done a favor for the debtor.
In fact it has left him with a collection agency hounding him on
a judgment that shows he owes more than he actually should.
In effect it magnifies an abuse that Professor Shuchman and a few
state legislatures 62 believe is the most troublesome aspect of the
whole auto repossession and collection business.
6. ARE PRIVATE REPOSSESSORS MORE OR LESS LIKELY TO DISTURB
THE PRIVACY AND UPSET THE LIFE OF THE DEBTOR
THAN ARE OFFICIAL REPOSSESSORS?
The Uniform Commercial Code permits self-help repossession
only if there is no breach of the peace. Typically the courts have
interpreted this section to mean that a creditor can snatch the car
off the street at night but that he may not confront the debtor, go
into his home, or secure the car by misrepresentation.6 3 Neither
the number of reported cases nor debtor-creditor folklore indicates
that a significant percentage of self-help repossessions have involved
breach of the peace.
Official repossessions are not limited by similar breach of the
peace restrictions. In Michigan for example the sheriff may use
reasonable force;64 if the debtor refuses to give up the car, pre-
sumably the sheriff may get out his gun and threaten the debtor
62. Wisconsin has greatly altered its procedure for dealing with resale
and has considerably restricted deficiency judgments at least in the used
car market:
If the merchant repossesses or accepts voluntary surrender of goods
which were not the subject of the sale but in which he has a se-
curity interest to secure a debt arising from a sale of goods or serv-
ices or a combined sale of goods and services and the amount ow-
ing at the-time of default was $1,000 or less, the customer is not
personally liable to the merchant for the unpaid balance of the
debt arising from the sale, and the merchant's duty to dispose of the
collateral is governed by the provisions on disposition of collateral
under chs. 401 to 409.
Wis. STAT. § 425.209(3) (1971).
Washington has effectively abolished deficiencies in many consumer
cases:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code, in the case of a
purchase money security interest in consumer goods taken or retained
by the seller of such collateral to secure all or part of its price, the
debtor shall not be liable for any deficiency after the secured party
has disposed of such collateral under RCW 62A.9-504 or has retained
such collateral in satisfaction of the debt under subsection (2) of
RCW 62A.9-505.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9-501 (1966).
63. See, e.g., Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934);
Dominick v. Rea, 226 Mich. 594, 198 N.W. 184 (1924); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Smithey, 426 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). See also cases cited in note
36 supra, and Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 350 (1965).
64. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 600.7351 (1948) (sheriff's powers to
seize goods).
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or remove him from the car with whatever force is necessary
Conceivably the sheriff can even arrest a troublesome debtor. A
repossession by state officials is likely to occur in the daytime,
perhaps in the presence of the neighbors. Some may argue that it
is better to have a car repossessed in midday in the presence of
everyone than to wake up in the morning and find it gone.
Quaere what the typical debtor would say about that? It is not
clear to me that the public seizure and towing and the possible
threat to one's family are to be preferred over the private repos-
sessor with his jump wire. Indeed if I were to balance the scale, I
would conclude that there is a greater likelihood of a disturbance
of the debtor's privacy in the official repossession case than there
is in the prototype of the private repossession case.
So much for the potential costs to society and to the debtor. The
first four questions revealed costs to society of instituting an ex-
clusively judicial repossession process. The last two questions
deal with added costs to the debtor himself that might result from
this institution of a judicial repossession system. Presumably the
balancing system must not only weigh the cost to society but, in
determining the individual benefit, should conduct a subsidiary
weighing and net those parts of the procedure which are good for
the individual against those which are not.
B. The Benefits of Judicial Repossession
1. HOW OFTEN ARE GOODS REPOSSESSED FROM
THE DEBTOR WHO IS NOT IN DEFAULT?
If goods are repossessed from debtors who are in fact current on
their payments in a significant percentage of the cases, and debtors
lose the goods as a result of this repossession, that is surely an in-
tolerable circumstance and it should be remedied. However, both
Professor Johnson's data and the experience in the reported cases65
indicate quite the opposite.
Professor Johnson's California data show that on the average
each contract from which a repossession arises has been rewritten
65. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed
sub nom., Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, No. 72-1484, 9th Cir.,
Mar. 15, 1972), represents two consolidated cases. In Adams plaintiff
Adams had received six letters and numerous phone calls demanding
payment between the time of default and repossession. By the time of
repossession, Adams was over 4 months delinquent in his payments.
In the companion case, Posadas v. Star & Crescent Federal Credit Union,
338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), plaintiff Posadas was over 3 months de-
linquent in his payments when his truck was repossessed by the de-
fendant.
In Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., Civil No. C929-71 (N.J. Super. Ct.,
Union Cty., Sept. 29, 1972), plaintiff Messenger had been more than 10 days
late with 12 payments out of a total of 14 before his car was repossessed.
The defendant-bank, which repossessed the car, claimed it attempted to
contact the plaintiff by telephone and by mail prior to repossession.
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or extended between three and four times.60 Moreover, on the
average they show almost 30 telephone calls, delinquency notices,
or personal contacts with the debtor before repossession." These
data are inconsistent with the proposition that cars are often re-
possessed from debtors who are current in their payments. His
data confirm the creditor folklore that the creditor stands to lose
money on each repossession and that it is in his selfish economic
interest to consider a variety of alternatives prior to repossession. 8
Moreover I know of no other data nor have I heard even the most
zealous consumer advocates argue that repossession from debtors
not actually in default is a serious problem.
2. HOW MANY OF THOSE DEBTORS IN DEFAULT AT TIME OF REPOSSESSION
HAVE DEFENSES THAT WOULD CAUSE A JUDGE TO ALLOW THEM
TO KEEP THE CAR PENDING THE OUTCOME OF TRIAL?
If the debtor has a complete setoff and so has a right to keep his
car without payment, he may be grievously injured by a reposses-
sion and resale of the automobile. If, on the other hand, his setoff
or counterclaim is one for $50 or $100 which would not wipe out
his $500 in arrearages, the self-help repossession of the automobile
does not deny him the right to the car in circumstances in which
the due process hearing would give it to him. Even if his claim
were meritorious, it would not entitle him to possession of the au-
tomobile, and his right to a hearing would not enable him to keep
his car.
In her brief before the Ninth Circuit in Adams v. Egley, Pro-
fessor Mentschikoff argues first that a debtor must give notice in
order to have a right to set off under section 2-717 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, and second that most purchasers of new cars
have given up the right to set off by their agreement on the sales
contract69 to accept repair or replacement of the car.
Although Professor Mentschikoff may overstate her case some-
what,70 her analysis of the Uniform Commercial Code is theoreti-
66. R. Johnson, supra note 6, at 17.
67. See note 43 supra.
68. Id.
69. Brief for Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code, supra note 6.
70. Some courts have found clauses that limit the buyer's remedies
to be invalid. For example in Orange Motors v. Dade County Dairies, 10
UCC REP. SERV. 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972) and Rehurek v. Chrys-
ler Credit Corp., 10 UCC REP. SERV. 988 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970), the
courts held the clauses invalid because they were not conspicuous. In
Russo v. Hilltop Lincoln Mercury, 10 UCC REP. SERV. 768 (Mo. Ct. App.
1972), where a car was totally destroyed in a fire as a result of defective
wiring, the seller's clause in the contract attempting to limit the buyer's
remedy to repair and replacement did not bar a suit for damages, since
there was no car to repair. Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, 125 Ga.
App. 462 (1972) held that once a seller has refused to repair, or unsuccess-
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cally correct. However it seems likely that any debtor with a bona
fide and sizable setoff will be able to negotiate a reduction in the
total price and to get his car back. At least if the debtor can
make newly agreed payments for the balance, Professor Johnson's
data show that the creditor is most likely to accept the adjustment.
If, as a practical matter, the judicial hearing will permit the
debtor to keep his car, it is no answer that the judge should not
give his car back or that the creditor has no legal obligation to re-
turn it. If the judicial proceeding offers him an opportunity to
present this argument to the creditor and if a significant number
of debtors will do so, but if those same debtors will not present
their arguments if the car is simply taken, then the hearing has
given him a substantial benefit. This is so notwithstanding the
fact that he may have no legal right to return of the car.
The question then becomes, how many debtors have bona fide
claims of substance that they could assert? We have no data on
this question. Professor Johnson makes a variety of assumptions
about people, but I am skeptical of them. He concludes that, since
60 percent of the people give up the car when the creditor asks
for repossession, those debtors have no defenses. It is equally
plausible that they have no lawyer, that they are not confident of
their own ability to present the defense, or that they are cynical
about the court's willingness to listen to a defense. Thus I find
Professor Johnson's data on this point unpersuasive. However that
is not to say that I believe that a large number of debtors whose
cars are repossessed have significant bona fide claims to assert
against their sellers. Indeed my guess would be the opposite and
my anectdotal experience in legal aid practice suggests that with a
little lawyer stimulation most debtors can think up a complaint or
two, but rarely do these amount to significant bona fide objections
of the kind that would cause a creditor to forego any significant
part of his claim. My guess, therefore, is that Professor Johnson
is correct, although I know of no data that support his conclusion.
3. HOW MANY DEBTORS AMONG THOSE WITH SUCH
DEFENSES WILL ASSERT THEM?
If 999 debtors out of 1,000 whose cars were repossessed had good
defenses to the claims of default by their creditors, but if none of
them would present those claims at a replevin hearing, there would
be no need for the replevin hearing and they would not benefit by it.
My guess, as indicated above, is that far fewer than 999 out of
1,000 have such defenses and my further guess is that among those
with such defenses, only an insignificant minority would come to
fully repaired, this clause is no longer effective as a limitation of remedies.
But see also Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Ct. Civ.
App. 1972) where such a clause was upheld.
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court in a replevin suit to present them. On this question there are
some data.
Professor Johnson quotes a study of the National Commission on
Consumer Finance to the effect that, in cases in which the creditor
is a bank, 65 percent of the defendants in deficiency cases default,
while in cases in which the creditor is a finance company, 47 per-
cent of the defendants default.71 Those data are consistent with
my experience. All data that are known to me suggest that a large
number of consumer defendants always default. Of course it is
conceivable that their behavior could be changed by an aggressive
education process. But it is more likely that the bulk of consumer
defendants will continue to default. Many will do so because they
have no effective defense; others because they are afraid or igno-
rant. In any event it is likely that any prerepossession hearing will
be sparsely attended by defendants and will therefore do little to
enable debtors to keep their cars.
C. The Balance of Costs and Benefits
When one has put all the data on the scale and made his best
guesses about facts unknown, how does the due process scale tip?
Does it call for the elimination of self-help repossession? In the
face of Professor Johnson's data no one can seriously dispute that
the removal of self-help repossession will substantially increase
car lenders' costs. Professor Johnson's conclusion that these costs
will come to rest on the shoulders of the debtor class is more
speculative, but it is greatly in the creditors' self-interest to pass
the costs on, and nothing suggests that the creditors cannot do so.
Thus on one side of the scale I find a heavy cost borne principally
by the consumer debtor class.
What are the benefits to the individual? Surely some debtors
who now lose their cars to repossessors will present defenses and
save their cars under a prehearing system. An occasional tricky
repossession would be foreclosed. But there are some potential
costs even to the individual-official repossession may be more
forceful and is likely to be more notorious than private reposses-
sion. Finding themselves in court to replevy, creditors who now
do not pursue deficiencies may choose to do so under a replevin
only system. One can only guess about how many out of 1,000
debtors might benefit from a compulsory judicial repossession sys-
tem. For the reasons given above, my guess is that only a handful
in a thousand would benefit. If one assumes that two or a half
dozen in a thousand who now lose their cars to self-help repos-
session would be able to keep them in a compulsory replevin case,
how does he come out? Are 120 or 360 cars worth $16 million? Are
71. R. Johnson, supra note 6, at 44, citing a National Commission on
Consumer Finance Press Release, May 5,1972.
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a few thousand cars worth $143 million? I conclude not; for me
the balance tips against the requirements of a prerepossession
hearing.
If one assumes that the costs and benefits are as I have suggested
above, he can distinguish this case from Fuentes on a due process
basis. First, the additional direct costs that the Fuentes decision
causes are not as great as those that would be caused by a denial of
self-help repossession. By hypothesis in the Fuentes case, the
creditor has already instituted a court action and has procured ser-
vice of the complaint and summons. Thus he has already paid the
entry fee, the service fee, and the initial lawyer's fee. That case
added only the cost of delay and the cost of a hearing.
It is likely that Fuentes is different from automobile repossession
in a second and more fundamental way. All the available evidence
suggests that replevin is used almost exclusively for furniture and
other nonautomobile consumer goods, whereas self-help reposses-
sion is used almost exclusively for seizing cars and not for seizing
other kinds of consumer goods. If one believes the folklore that
cars are the only widely held consumer goods that have any sig-
nificant resale value and that creditors take security interests in
furniture, hunting dogs, and such, not for their resale value, but
for the in terrorem effect that the threat of repossession will have
on the debtor, he can conclude that the creditor has much more at
stake in procuring speedy repossession of cars than of other con-
sumer goods. This is true for several reasons. For one thing by
hypothesis the opportunity costs of waiting for 30 days or 60 days is
marginal if the ultimate replevin will produce only the greasy arm
chair with no resale value. If the true goal of instituting replevin
proceedings in such cases is to maintain the credibility of the
creditor's threat of repossession, that goal is as easily achieved and
perhaps better achieved by a procedure which contains a hearing
requirement as it is by one which does not contain such a require-
ment. Although no one has been kind enough to collect the data
with respect to the replevin cases that Professor Johnson has col-
lected with respect to self-help cases, I believe it likely that the
additional costs which the creditor must assume because of the
Fuentes case are small indeed by comparison with those he would
be made to assume if Adams v. Egley were the law of the land.
Thus the Court could rationally conclude that the due process
clause does not require the abolition of self-help repossession in
Adams v. Egley and yet find that Fuentes v. Shevin remains good
law.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are three ways then in which a court could decide Adams
v. Egley in favor of the creditor without a direct attack on Fuentes
v. Shevin. First, easist and cleanest is the position adopted by the
court in Bank of America v. Oler; namely, to find there is no im-
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permissible state action in self-help repossession. A second possi-
bility is the one suggested by Justice White in his dissent in Fuen-
tes v. Shevin; namely, to find that there is a constitutional right,
but to hold that the creditor and debtor can waive that right by a
provision contained in the security agreement. As I have indi-
cated above, I find this an essentially dishonest route to the correct
result. Finally the Court can engage in a more careful weighing of
the interests than it did in Fuentes v. Shevin. If it does such a
weighing, I hope that it will conclude that there is no violation of
the due process clause by self-help repossession. The costs of
abolishing self-help repossession are great; the benefits for the in-
dividual debtor are uncertain and are probably small. In Fuentes
it is probable that both the costs and the benefits were small, and
thus a court might reasonably find the scales tipped one way in
Fuentes and another way in this case.
' In our demands for more and greater due process we lawyers
have sometimes behaved like engineers gone berserk. Just as an
engineer or an architect commissioned to do a job must be reined
in and made to consider the costs, so the lawyer and judge must be
made to measure the costs to society of these additional due process
requirements. Moreover the lawyer's and judge's role is a more
subtle one than the architect's, for due process, unlike a new build-
ing, is nothing in and of itself. It has value only to the extent that
it produces sounder and better results. That not all persons share
the lawyer's love of due process as an independent value is well
illustrated by a recent New Yorker cartoon. In that cartoon one
convict reponds to his cell mate by saying, "What's so good about
due process? Due process is what got me ten years."
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